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BOOK REVIEW
Federal Evidence. David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller. The
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., Rochester, N.Y. Five-
volume set. Pp. 4066. $237.50
CHARLES R. COLEMAN*
Of the projected five volumes, only four are in print,' due in part to
the untimely death of David Louisell in August of 19772 and the com-
prehensive nature of the treatise itself. At present, the work consists of
thirty-two hundred sixty-six pages presenting an inclusive body of evi-
dence law, which supplements the federal evidentiary rules with myr-
iad developmental and interpretive aspects.
The authors' purpose is best articulated in the preface, where refer-
ence is made to Justice Holmes' admonition:
[T]heory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as the
architect is the most important man who takes part in the building of a
house. . . . It is not to be feared as unpractical, for, to the competent, it
simply means going to the bottom of the subject.'
With this philosophy in mind, the authors propose "to go to the bottom
of the subject."4 Their work transcends the typical monograph, which
gestures more with verbal embroidery and legal ornament than with
precision and detail. Federal Evidence attests to the authors' commit-
ment, and each chapter reflects a painstaking effort to construct sound
legal architecture.
Just as the first car off the assembly line will suffer the inevitable
disadvantages of being first, the authors observe that the Federal Rules
of Evidence are fraught with deficiencies, mistakes, and disappoint-
* B.S., West Virginia State College; J.D., North Carolina Central University; Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law, North Carolina Central University.
1. The respective copyright dates for the existing four volumes are 1977, 1978, 1979, and
1980. Volume five has a tenative release date of February, 1981.
The volumes are updated by annual cumulative pocket supplements, but there is no charge for
upkeep materials issued within six months of order shipment. In addition, price is guaranteed at
$47.50 per volume for the complete set.
2. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE iii (1978).
3. i D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE iii (1977); Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1877).
4. 1 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3.
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ments.5 Subjectively, it is arguable that the rules resist interdisciplinary
interaction and suffer a cultural lag,6 but the authors pave the way to a
point of salvation: "[C]ould the [r]ules have been expected to do more
than countenance the case by case unfolding of the competencies of
science and technology?" 7 Thus, it is the wager of pro and con, of tra-
dition and innovation that engenders criticism and admiration. Yet,
with these realizations foremost in their minds, the authors' mission "to
go to the bottom of the subject" consists of an objective task that will
not be circumvented.
All lex scripa 8 in common law jurisdictions is subject to change
through judicial interpretation. Perforce, the federal rules offer no ex-
ception. Mueller and Louisell suggest changes both to the text of the
rules and to the interpretations.9 However, they do not draw conclu-
sions barren of support and impervious to reason, but clothe each posi-
tion with the essentials of objectivity.'0 The rules are a sensitive legal
ensemble that must be read and understood in relation to existing pre-
cedent and policy considerations giving rise to their enactment. An
evaluation of this codification cannot be reached solely by reference to
a rule number and its textual content. Only after interpretations of the
rules have been assembled and evaluated is a valid conclusion accessi-
ble. "
The treatise consists of an assembly of technical information and a
cadre of references, including frequent reference to scholars and
judges, law review articles, case law, federal and state statutory law,
and the extensive legislative history of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Interspersed among this impressive accumulation of authority are case
synopses, footnoted as the authors deem appropriate.
5. According to the authors, the most egregious are Article III (Presumptions in Civil Cases)
and Article V (Privileges). Id. at iv.
6. As the authors point out, these alleged deficiencies are "less certain and more subjec-
tive. . . .But it can hardly be denied that the [riules do little to effect a happy marriage between
[e]vidence and the learning of science, philosophy and the liberal arts; indeed do they even ar-
range a promising courtship?" Id.
7. Id.
8. Lex scripta is defined as: "Written law; law deriving its force not from usage, but from
express legislative enactment; statute law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 822 (5th ed. 1979).
9. 1 D. LouIsELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 3 at iii (preface). "Our point here is simply
that we have not let our general and deep admiration for the [r]ules blind us to strong criticism
where in our judgment it is necessary, or to suggestions for change which might be helpful." Id. at
V.
10. By way of illustration, the probable judicial interpretation that a court might give a par-
ticular rule is opined by the authors, but only after having displayed how that opinion was
reached. The authors' positions are substantiated by pre-rule or post-rule construction, by deci-
sional law, and arguably by the influence of the legislative history and surrounding policies giving
rise to that interpretation or proposed change. Id. at 8-22.
11. The discussion of rule 103 § i 1, entitled "Waiver of Objection by Introducing or Relying
upon Evidence-Invited Error and the Open Doctrine," is instructional. Id. at 45. Look also at
the discussion of the harmless error rule embodied in rule 103. Id. at 85-93.
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A general description of the treatise will demonstrate the comprehen-
siveness, complexity, and sophistication with which the authors have
treated the subject. Each volume of the existing four-volume set is vir-
tually identical in form. The substantive portion begins with a section
entitled "Analysis by Rule and Section" which imparts the basic organ-
ization of each volume. Chapter headings follow, denoting the general
subject matter of the rules dealt with in each chapter. The rules within
these headings are indexed by number and each rule is further divided
into sections. The sections introduce the topical analyses the authors
have devoted to the particular rule.' 2 The arrangement facilitates a
structured and organized approach to this broad and intractable area of
law. The topical analysis sections are particularly valuable in promot-
ing ease in locating a specific aspect of a rule which otherwise would be
impossible without sifting through pages of irrelevant information.
The aspect of the work warranting the greatest amount of credit is
the elaborate discussion of each rule. The rule itself is introduced by
stating its text, followed by the Advisory Committee note, the House
Judiciary Committee report, the Senate Judiciary report, the House
Senate Conference Committee report, and in some instances the
Supreme Court's view of the rule. There is an elaborate section depict-
ing research references from American Jurisprudence, American Law
Reports, case citations, related treatises, law review articles, and federal
and state statutes.' 3 Next, the authors analyze each rule, beginning
with the background and purpose of the rule. Here they discuss
whether the rule constituted a breakthrough in evidence law, and
whether the rule resolved any unanswered questions. If the rule under-
went any significant changes during the rulemaking process, they are
brought to light, as are earlier versions of the rule, comments on the
final draft, views of particular congressmen regarding the rule, and the
rule's relationship to the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform
Rules of Evidence. The function, purpose, and use of each rule are
explored in depth. The authors cite pre-rule and post-rule authority
substantiating what the rule does, what it was intended to do, whether
it accomplishes its purposes, how it should be construed (broadly or
narrowly), the reasons for that construction, and any unique character-
istics the rule possesses. The authors parallel the above format with
each and every rule. This approach produces a degree of clarity and a
depth of understanding consistent with their purpose of "going to the
bottom of the subject."
12. For example, rule 103 § 7 analyzes the "Objections Necessary to Preserve Rights of Ap-
peal." Id. at 36. Section 8 discusses the "Sufficiency of Objections-Timeliness and Statement of
Grounds." Id. at 33.
13. Illustrative is the rule 103 synopsis, which reads: Text of Rule 103, Advisory Committee's
Note, House-Senate Conference Committee Report, and Research Reference. Id. at 23.
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Because the Federal Rules were only recently promulgated,' 4 the de-
veloping body of law relative to their interpretation creates a difficult
task for those who undertake the construction of a reputable source
defining the rules' judicial identity. The organization of the federal
court system, with each circuit following its own case law, creates diffi-
culty in uniform interpretation and application, and a more difficult
task in reporting the recent decisions. This situation necessitates a
highly complex structure and the authors have made significant inroads
into creating a well-organized source.
The Mueller and Louisell compilation transcends and exposes the
summary presentation of the Federal Rules of Evidence by James Wil-
liam Moore in Moore's Federal Practice.'5 In all fairness, however, the
works of Moore may have had the purpose of presenting the rule for
textual references with a brief note on its legislative history. In keeping
with their stated purpose, Mueller and Louisell have made a rigorous
attempt to present the rules in a textual and contextual framework. Ex-
cept for the presentation of the text of the rule, a brief comment section,
and the Advisory Committee's note, the Moore publication is not com-
parable. It does have features, however, that induce some appeal-
mainly the easier accessibility of certain types of information.
16
For reasons that already should be apparent, Federal Evidence can
best be used by judges, practitioners,'" and law school professors. The
intricate treatment may cause law students to evade its use. Without a
sound familiarity with evidence law, the treatment of one rule's interac-
tion with other rules and statutes could be stifling. The volume of the
work would also weigh against its routine use by law students.
A book review without some criticism is arguably no review at all.
Although the treatise is exemplary in many ways, I have found
problems in its use. Foremost, the treatise is too detailed for everyday
use. One would have to read several sections to obtain a clear under-
standing of a single rule. In addition, there is no parallel reference
table,' 8 and the rule numbers are often mentioned in the text without
14. The Federal Rules of Evidence are a derivation of legislative enactment. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2076 (1975).
15. 7 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1976).
16. For example, in Moore's treatise, the exceptions to rule 802, the Hearsay Rule, do not
have to be ascertained by laboring through pages of detailed explanation. Id. at 47-199.
17. In their preface to the treatise, the authors indicate: "As practitioners, both of us have
experienced the exigencies and urgencies of [e]vidence questions in the trial of lawsuits. The crav-
ing of trial court and counsel for certain, authoritative and readily ascertainable answers is as
reasonable and inevitable as it is instinctual." I D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, Supra note 3.
18. For example, because each rule interacts with other rules and existing law, in order to
project the consequential effect of a rule, one would need a reference to the other rules that inter-
act with the rule with which you are concerned. The Uniform Commercial Code comment section
usually lists code section related to the code section discussed. Of course, further reference to
relevant federal law would facilitate an obvious purpose.
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any topical reference to the rule itself. Some of the references are to
rules in the volume not yet in print. Another concern is the often re-
dundant discussion of the rules, especially the restatements of legisla-
tive history in the narrative portion. A final problem is that what is
authoritative in one circuit as the judicial construction of a rule is not
authoritative in another. These differences in interpretation may also
pose problems in updating the treatise with appropriate decisions from
the respective circuits. The same problem, however, exists with the
case annotations in the United States Code Annotated.
In conclusion, a familiarity with this work will yield two distinct ben-
efits: the reduction of non-volitional inaccuracies and, if used as source
material, the early identification of problems as they emerge. As re-
vealed by this treatise, a comprehensive understanding of the Federal
Rules of Evidence cannot be achieved without "going to the bottom of
the subject."
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